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REFUSALS TO DEAL BY VERTICALLY INTEGRATING
NEWSPAPER MONOPOLISTS: PASCHALL V.
KANSAS CITY STAR CO.
CHARLES R. ANDRESt
Ever since Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, a debate
has persisted over the proper goals and economic theories of the antitrust
laws, which have had a profound efect on the structure of 'ndustry in
America. Vertical integration by newspaper publishers into a once in-
dependent system of distribution has again raised fundamental questions
regarding the proper goals and economic theories of antitrust. In Pas-
chall v. Kansas City Star Co., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
confronted these questions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the breakup of American Telephone & Telegraph demon-
strates, antitrust laws' have a significant impact on market struc-
" Charles R. Andres is an associate at Copp, Koletsky & Berall, in New London,
Connecticut. Mr. Andres received his B.A. from Middlebury College in 1977, and his
M.A.R. from Yale Divinity School in 1981. In 1984, he received his J.D. from the Univer-
sity of Connecticut.
1. The main provisions of the federal antitrust laws are found in the Sherman Act of
1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982) (prohibiting contracts or conspiracies to restrain trade, mo-
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ture. 2 Although antitrust laws focus primarily on market conduct
rather than market structure,3 changes in market structure inevita-
bly follow as courts define the parameters of permissible business
practice. 4 This observation also holds true in the area of vertical
restraints. 5 An industry's method of delivering its products to the
nopolization, and attempted monopolization); the Clayton Act of 1914, id §§ 12, 13, 14-
19, 20, 21, 22-27, as modified by the Robinson-Patman Anti Discrimination Act of 1936,
id. §§ 13-13b, 21a; the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, id. §§ 18, 21; and the Antitrust Proce-
dural Improvements Act of 1980, id §§ 15-15a, 15c, 16a, 18 (prohibiting price discrimina-
tion, exclusive dealing and tying contracts, acquisitions of competing companies, and
interlocking directorates when such practices substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly); and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, as amended by the
Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, id § 45(a)(1) (prohibiting unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce). See A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE
ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3-5 (3d ed. 1980) (outlining the
main provisions of American antitrust laws).
2. Market structure refers to those elements in a market that exercise strategic influ-
ence on competition and pricing. See generallyJ. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION chs. 5-
8 (2d ed. 1968) (general discussion of market structure). The elements of market structure
include "the number and size distribution of sellers and buyers, the breadth of the market
and character of demand, the degree of product differentiation, and the conditions of
entry." Knox, Antitrust Exemptions for Newspapers- An Economic Analysis, 1971 LAW & SOC.
ORDER 3, 13; see alsoJ. BAIN, supra, at 7.
3. The federal antitrust laws operate primarily by prohibiting anticompetitive prac-
tices rather than prescribing market structure. See supra note 1. Although antitrust laws
regulate conduct rather than structure, these laws can have a direct impact on market
structure when courts order divestiture as a remedy for antitrust violations. Similarly, a
preemptive divestiture may occur if the Justice Department fails to approve a proposed
merger. Seegenerally A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, supra note 1, at 403-07 (discussion of practi-
cal limits of divestiture decrees).
In contrast to market structure, market conduct consists of the policies and practices
employed by a firm in adapting to its markets. Lee, Antitrust Enforcement, Freedom of the
Press, and "Open Market"." The Supreme Court on the 5?ructure and Conduct of Mass Media, 32
VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1979).
4. See Lee, supra note 3, at 1253.
5. Vertical restraints are restrictions on the use of products imposed by those at one
stage of production (usually manufacturers) on those at another stage of production (usu-
ally distributors). Examples of vertical restraints include a manufacturer's requirements
that distributors deal exclusively in the manufacturer's products, or that the distributor
have an exclusive franchise within its area of distribution of the manufacturer's product.
A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, supra note 1, at 249. The Supreme Court's most thorough dis-
cussion of vertical restraints is found in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (all vertical restrictions are not per se illegal, but particular applications of
restrictions may be illegal under some circumstances).
Vertical restraints can be contrasted with horizontal restraints, such as agreements by
competing firms operating at the same level concerning matters such as price-setting or
market-sharing. A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, supra note 1, at 249. In general, horizontal
restraints are more likely to be condemned by the antitrust laws than are vertical re-
straints. See Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dinensional Antitrust Poliy, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
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market depends to a large extent on what practices are permissible
under the antitrust laws.6 What is permissible under the antitrust
laws depends on the goals7 and economic theories" courts
emphasize.
The newspaper industry offers a good example of the tension
existing today over the proper goals and theories of the antitrust
6. The Supreme Court has addressed the validity of a variety of vertical arrange-
ments under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (territorial re-
straints not per se illegal); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum resale
price maintenance is per se illegal); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961) (exclusive supply contract not illegal if it did not substantially lessen competition in
relevant market); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (manufacturer's
refusal to deal coupled with inducements by manufacturer to wholesalers to not join in
price cutting violated Sherman Act); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958) (lease of land owned by Northern Pacific requiring lessee to use Northern Pacific's
lines to ship all commodities produced on the leased land was an illegal tying contract in
violation of the Sherman Act); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949)
(exclusive supply contract violated Clayton Act); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300 (1919) (no violation of Sherman Act when manufacturer refused to deal with distribu-
tor who did not sell at manufacturer's suggested price); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (manufacturer cannot require distributor by con-
tract to maintain prescribed retail prices).
7. The goals of the antitrust laws continue to be debated over 90 years after the first
of these laws, the Sherman Act of 1890, was enacted. See infta notes 219-21 and accompa-
nying text. Two views exist concerning the proper goals of the antitrust laws. One school
advocates economic efficiency as the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., I P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 103-04 (1978); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 90-91 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4
(1976). These comentators believe the primary goal of the antitrust laws is to "maximize
consumer economic welfare through efficiency in the use and allocation of scarce re-
sources." I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra, 103 (Areeda and Turner state that eco-
nomic efficiency is achieved through "progressiveness in the development of new
productive techniques and new products that put those resources to better use"). The size
of a business alone should not offend the antitrust laws. Cf United States v. Swift & Co.,
286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) ("mere size . . . is not an offense against the Sherman Act");
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920) ("But we must adhere
to the law, and the law does not make mere size an offense, or the existence of unexerted
power an offense"); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1910) (purpose
of §§ I and 2 of Sherman Act was to "prevent undue restraints of every kind and nature");
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1948) (competitor,
who by his "superior skill, foresight and industry" captures monopoly market has not
violated Sherman Act: "The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must
not be turned upon when he wins"); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
The other school believes that efficiency goals should be supplemented and possibly
overriden by nonefficiency goals. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 3-5 (1977); Lande,
Wealth Transfers as the Onginal and Prnmaiy Concern of Antitrust." The E fiency Interpretation Chal-
lenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (1982); Schwartz, "Jusstice" and ot ler Non-economic Goals of Anti-
trust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); see also in/fa notes 22J-25 and accompanying text.
8. See in/fa notes 152-209 and accompanying text.
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laws. Newspaper publishers have traditionally used independent
distributors to deliver newspapers to customers. 9 As a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in Abrecht v. Herald Co.,"' however, in
which the Court ruled that independent distributers have com-
plete autonomy in setting retail prices," many publishers aban-
doned the traditional method of distribution in favor of self-
distribution.' 2 This change in distribution methods caused many
distributors to lose their businesses 13 and caused many courts to re-
evaluate their position on the goals and economic theories of the
antitrust laws concerning vertical integration.
14
In Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co.,' 5 the Eighth Circuit had an
opportunity to re-examine its position regarding vertical integra-
tion. A divided court' 6 held that a newspaper publisher did not
violate section 2 of the Sherman Act' 7 by switching to self-distribu-
tion and refusing to deal with its former distributors. The division
in the court was caused by disagreement over the basic goals and
theories that should govern the legality of a vertical integration.
This Article examines Paschall and the tension in the antitrust
laws generated by a newspaper's vertical integration and refusal to
deal with former distributors. The author argues that the major-
ity's choice of advancing economic efficiency and realistically ex-
amining the competitive effects of vertical integration by a
newspaper monopolist was proper. The author first examines the
9. See inf/a note 23 and accompanying text.
10. 390 U.S. 145 (1968); see in/ra notes 40-54 and accompanying text (analyzing Al-
brecht and its effect).
11. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
12. See i'nra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
13. See in/ra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
14. See in/ra note 52.
15. 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), appeal
docketed, No. 83-2001 (Sup. Ct. June 5, 1984).
16. The Eighth Circuit considered Paschall both as a panel and en banc. See in/ra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text. A majority of the panel decision ruled against the
Star initially. Paschall, 695 F.2d 322. Judge Henley filed a strong dissent. Id at 339 (Hen-
ley, J., dissenting). On rehearing en banc, however, the majority overruled the panel
decision and adopted the viewpoint of the panel dissent. Paschall, 727 F.2d 692. Strong
dissents were filed by the panel majority. Id. at 704 (Heaney, J., dissenting), 706 (Bright,
J., dissenting). The Eighth Circuit, therefore, split into two factions over the outcome of
Paschall. For simplicity, this Article will refer to the majority and dissenting opinions in
the en bane decision as the two views of the court.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire. . . to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Id
[Vol. I11
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structure of the newspaper industry and how it was affected by
Albrecht,18 and argues that Albrecht gave insufficient consideration
to the competitive pressures in the industry. Second, the author
discusses the Paschall decision, concluding that the harm done by
Albrecht would be accentuated by a decision in favor of independ-
ent distributors. 19 Finally, the author analyzes the economic theo-
ries and antitrust goals advanced in Paschall and discusses how
these should be applied to the newspaper industry.20
II. NEWSPAPER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
A. Structure of the Newspaper Industry
Like all industries, the newspaper industry has developed meth-
ods for delivering its product to consumers. 21 In the newspaper
industry, distribution involves receiving and soliciting subscrip-
tions, generating lists, hiring and supervising carriers, dealing with
delivery problems, billing, and collecting payment.2 2 Tradition-
ally, newspapers have hired independent distributors to distribute
their papers. 23 These distributors purchase the papers from pub-
lishers and pursue their own marketing and pricing strategies.2 4
Most independent distributors share a number of common char-
acteristics. The typical distributor operates within an exclusive
territory without competition from other dealers.25 Territorial re-
strictions, which may be incorporated into the distributor's con-
tract with a paper,26 reflect the economies of scale in newspaper
18. See infra notes 21-85 and accompanying text.
19. See ihfa notes 86-147 and accompanying text.
20. See infa notes 148-235 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Strasser, Vertical Territoral Restraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and
Proposed New Rule, 1977 DUKE L.J. 775, 785-94 (1977) (discussion of functions and needs of
distribution systems and reasons for use of vertical territorial restraints).
22. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 729.4b7 (Supp. 1982).
23. Bioff & Paul, Employee and Independent Contractors.- Legal Imphcations of Conversion/rom
One to the Other, 4 CoMM/ENT 649, 650 (1982); see, e.g., Paschall, 727 F.2d at 694; Auburn
News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 275 (1st Cir. 1981); Newberry v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 473 (D.D.C. 1977); Hardin v. Houston Chronicle Pub-
lishing Co., 434 F. Supp. 54, 55 (S.D. Tex. 1977). One reason for using independent
distributors as opposed to employees was to avoid unionization of persons engaged in dis-
tribution. Bioff & Paul, supra, at 650.
24. See Bioff & Paul, supra note 23, at 650. Publishers, however, often attempted to
influence the prices at which distributors resold the papers. See sn/ra note 41 and accompa-
nying text.
25. See, e.g., Paschall, 727 F.2d at 694; Auburn News Co., 659 F.2d at 275; Newberry, 438
F. Supp. at 473.
26. In Paschall, 727 F.2d at 694-95, the exclusive territorial agreements were specified
in the distributor's contract with the publisher. In Newbery, 439 F. Supp. at 473, the
19851
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routes. 27 Because the marginal cost of delivering an additional
newspaper is small in relation to the fixed costs of establishing the
route 2 8 a distributor may be able to deliver a large number of
papers at approximately the same cost as he could deliver half the
amount. 29 Thus, delivery routes have characteristics of a natural
monopoly. 3
0
Since distributors operate independently of the publisher, they
have the power to set their own retail prices. 3' Similarly, since
distributors operate without competition in their exclusive territo-
ries, they can extract monopoly profits from their subscribers. 32 As
distributors bought papers from the publisher for resale in designated areas. The con-
tracts contained no explicit prohibition against selling outside the area, but were designed
to limit each distributor's sales to a designated area. In Auburn, 659 F.2d at 275, the terri-
torial division was not an explicit condition of the relationship between the newspaper and
the distributor, or among the distributors, but was respected by all. In McGuire v. Times
Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57 (C.D. Cal. 1975), the agreements between the publisher and
the distributors specified the territories each distributor was obligated to serve, but did not
specifically restrict any dealer to sales within the designated territory. Id. at 61.
The legality of exclusive territories under § 1 of the Sherman Act was questioned by
the Supreme Court in Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153-54. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently interpreted Albrecht as holding that exclusive territory arrangements between
newspaper publishers and distributors are per se violations of § 1. Noble v. McClatchy
Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1975). After the Supreme Court adopted a
more permissive view of vertical restraints in GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 57-59, lower
courts have upheld exclusive territory arrangements. See, e.g., Aewbery, 438 F. Supp. at
475.
27. Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration by the Newspaper Monopoist, 69 IOWA L. REv. 451,
452-53 (1984).
28. Id. at 453. The largest fixed costs of a delivery route (costs that a distributor must
incur apart from the number of papers delivered) are the costs of delivery vehicles and
wages for carriers. Id.
29. Id
30. Id at 452; see also Newbery, 438 F. Supp. at 474 (dealer territories had aspects of a
natural monopoly since territories specified in dealer contracts were tailored for the most
efficient delivery). A natural monopoly arises when, because of economies of scale, it is
more efficient for a product or service to be provided by only one economic entity. C.
FERGUSON & J. GOULD, MICROECONOMIC THEORY § 9.l.b (4th ed. 1975).
31. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), has been construed to pro-
hibit manufacturers from requiring distributors by contract to maintain a prescribed retail
price. Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. 373. Of course, newspaper publishers have some
control over retail rates by the wholesale rates they charge distributors.
32. See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 454. Monopoly profits represent the profit the
monopolist obtains over that which he would obtain under competitive conditions. These
"1excess" profits are possible because a monopolist is able to increase its profits by lowering
its output and increasing its price, a practice normally precluded by competitive pressures.
Under monopoly conditions, therefore, prices for a product will be higher and volume will
be lower than under competitive conditions. See Kamerschen, The Economic Effects of Mo-
nopoly: A Lawyer's Guide to Antitrust Economics, 27 MERCER L. REv. 1061, 1062 (1976), re-
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a result, publishers have adopted various methods to pressure deal-
ers to sell at the lowest possible price.
33
Like distributors, newspapers often have monopoly characteris-
tics. Many daily newspapers are the sole suppliers of daily printed
media in a given area. 34 Most newspapers, however, are only sec-
ondarily in the business of selling news to readers. Their primary
business-and major source of profits-is the sale of newspaper
space to advertisers.3 5 Although advertising rates vary, the rate is
usually a function of circulation. The higher the circulation, the
more the paper can charge for its advertising. 36 Newspaper pub-
lishers thus have a strong incentive to increase their circulation.
Because of these considerations, publishers and distributors do
not share the same circulation goals. The distributor, as a monop-
olist, seeks to increase its profits by pricing higher and reducing
output. 37 The publisher, however, finds it unprofitable to set a
monopoly price for its newspaper, since the resulting reduction in
volume3a decreases its advertising profits. 39 These conflicting goals
33. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 149-50 (publisher suggested retail price and when plaintiff
charged more than suggested price, publisher hired a firm to compete with plaintiff and
later terminated plaintiff's distributorship); see also Newbery, 438 F. Supp. at 481 (newspa-
per raised its wholesale price to distributor after distributor raised his price to customers).
34. See, e.g., Paschall, 727 F.2d at 694-96 (the Star owns the only two major daily
newspapers in the Kansas City area). The number of cities with competing newspapers
has fallen from 689 in 1910 to 51 in 1983. Jones, Plight of Weaker Newspapers, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 12, 1983, at 29, col. 3. See generallv B. OWEN, EcONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF Ex-
PRESSION ch. 2 (1972) (analyzing economic structure of the newspaper industry in the
United States from the eighteenth century to the present); Comment, Individual and Chain
Newspaper Conduct Versus the Antitrust Laws: What Boundaries Do The Traditional Means of
Checking Economic Concentration Establish For the Newspaper Industry?, 14 GoNZ. L. REv. 819
(1979) (analyzing the application and effectiveness of the federal antitrust laws to the
newspaper industry). Congress has enacted legislation designed to assist failing newspa-
pers. Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1982). This legislation has been
criticized as protectionist towards existing publishers while creating barriers to entry for
new newspapers. See Knox, supra note 2; Comment, The Newspaper Preservattn Act, 32 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 347 (197 1) (arguing that the Newspaper Preservation Act is anticompetitive
in nature).
35. See, e.g., McCuie, 405 F. Supp. at 62 (dominant Los Angeles daily newspaper earns
85% of revenue from advertising, 15% from circulation); B. OWEN, supra note 34, at 35;
Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 455. In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 610 (1952), the Court observed that "every newspaper is a dual trader in
separate though interdependent markets; it sells the paper's news and advertising content
to its readers; in effect that readership is in turn sold to the buyers of advertising space."
Id
36. SeePaschall, 727 F.2d at 701; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 22, at 729.7a;
Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 455-56; Knox, supra note 2, at 13; Roberts, Antitrust Problems
in the Newspaper Industry, 82 HARV. L. REv. 319, 324 (1968).
37. See supra note 32 (discussion of monopoly pricing).
38. Volume will drop as a result of a price increase only if demand for newspapers is
1985]
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have led to antitrust litigation between publishers and distributors.
B. Albrecht v. Herald Co. and Its Fallout
In Albrecht v. Herald Co.,40 the Supreme Court addressed the va-
lidity of a common practice employed by newspaper publishers to
pressure distributors to keep subscription costs down: suggesting a
retail price and threatening to compete with or terminate a dis-
tributor who charged more than that price. 4  When the plaintiff,
Albrecht, charged more than the suggested price, the Herald hired
a firm to compete with the plaintiff and later fired the plaintiff
after he initiated an antitrust action. 42 The Supreme Court ruled
that the Herald's actions constituted maximum resale price main-
tenance, and as such were per se illegal under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.
4 3
The Supreme Court reasoned that maximum, like minimum, re-
sale price fixing disrupts the market equilibrium by substituting
the judgment of a seller for competitive market forces.44 The
Court concluded that maximum resale price maintenance should
be condemned by the same per se rule that condemns minimum
resale price maintenance. 45 Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that
elastic. Studies have shown that the price elasticity of demand for newspapers is quite
high. Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 457 n.28; see also Paschall, 695 F.2d at 330 & n.10
(circulation decreased when paper raised price).
39. As noted by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Albrecht, "Because the major portion
of the [publisher's] income derives from advertising rather than from sales to distributors,
the [publisher's] self-interest is in keeping the retail price of the paper low in order to
increase circulation and thereby increase advertising revenues." 390 U.S. at 169 n.2
(Stewart, J., dissenting); see znfra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
40. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
41. Id. at 147-48.
42. Id
43. Id at 153. Prior to Albrecht, a federal district court decided a case involving simi-
lar issues in a different manner. Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 825,
830 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (absent evidence of a combination or conspiracy, publisher's refusal to
deal with newspaper distributors unless distributors would abide by publisher's price pol-
icy was no more than a unilateral refusal to deal and did not violate §§ 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act).
44. 390 U.S. at 152.
45. Id at 151-53. The per se rule and the rule of reason are standards used by courts
to evaluate alleged antitrust violations. Under the rule of reason, a court will evaluate the
impact of alleged misconduct on competitive conditions. Only if the misconduct harms
competition will an antitrust violation be found. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-90 (1978). A per se rule operates to condemn
certain practices without regard to the effect the practices have on competition. A per se
rule will be invoked "when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompe-
titive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged con-
[Vol. I11
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price ceilings differ from price floors and are ill-suited to a per se
rule.46 He also argued that the Court had distorted the section 1
requirement of a combination or conspiracy by finding a combina-
tion in the Herald's essentially unilateral action.47 Justice Stewart,
in a dissent joined by Justice Harlan, indicated that price ceilings
may be appropriate where resellers are monopolists and are able to
engage in supracompetitive pricing.
48
Justice Harlan concluded by stating, "Today's decision leaves
[the Herald] with no alternative but to use its own trucks."
'49
Although prophecies of greater evil are standard fare among losing
parties and dissenting judges, 50 in this instance history proved the
threat to be correct. 5 1  Following Abrecht, many publishers
changed their distribution systems in order to gain more direct
control over the retail price of their papers. 52 These changes in-
duct." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 (1984). For example, because
price fixing is per se illegal, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
211-14 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-401 (1927), the
only evidence necessary to establish an antitrust violation is evidence that there was in fact
an agreement to fix prices. No evidence will be admitted concerning whether the agree-
ment was reasonable or would actually benefit consumers. See A. NEALE & D. GOYDER,
supra note 1, at 30-31.
46. 390 U.S. at 156-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. Id at 160-64.
48. Id at 168-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. Id at 168. The Albrecht decision has been frequently criticized. See Handler, Re-
forming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1301-07 (1982); Hovenkamp, supra
note 27, at 461; The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 257-58 (1968).
50. Cf Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319-20 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (consequences of Court's prohibition of requirement contracts will be to en-
courage companies to adopt further measure of industrial concentration).
51. Most commentators at that time did not believe that publishers would move to
self-distribution because of Albrecht. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 49, at
260 (suggesting that manufacturers were not likely to integrate forward to avoid Albrecht's
prohibition against maximum resale price maintenance because of the practical barriers to
forward integration). For a description of such barriers, see Comanor, Vertical Territorial
and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1435-36
(1968).
52. See, e.g., Paschall, 695 F.2d 322; White v. Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1982);
Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 921 (1982); Naify v. McClatchy Newspapers, 599 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1979); Knutson
v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977);
Neugebauer v. A.S. Abell Co., 474 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Md. 1979); Newberry v. Washington
Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977); Hardin v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.,
434 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Tex. 1977), af'd, 572 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Mc-
Guire v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Lamarca v. Miami Herald
Publishing Co., 395 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Fla.), afdmem., 524 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1975). In
Newberiy, 438 F. Supp. at 484, the court stated:
The [Washington] Post shifted to the agency system largely as a result of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Albrecht, which cast doubt on the legality of systems of
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volved the forward integration of the publisher into the distribu-
tion level, coupled with a refusal to sell newspapers wholesale to
independent distributors. 53 These refusals to deal have sparked a
number of antitrust actions by terminated distributors.
54
C. Refusals to Deal: Liability Under the Sherman Act
Refusals to deal by forward integrating monopolists have been
challenged under both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 55 En-
couraged by the broad definition of conspiracy in Albrecht,56 and its
holding that maximum resale price maintenance is per se unlaw-
ful, 57 many discharged distributors included section 1 claims in
suits against vertically integrating newspapers. 58 In these cases,
the discharged distributors claimed that the purpose of the distri-
bution change was unlawfully to control resale prices. 59 Courts,
dealer distribution, such as the Post's, then employed by many newspapers across
the country. After an unsuccessful effort by the industry to obtain relief from the
Congress, the Post determined that a different method of distribution was desira-
ble to avoid the business risks involved and to assure orderly pricing of its
product.
Id, see also Bioff & Paul, supra note 23, at 650-53.
53. See, e.g., Paschall, 695 F.2d at 325.
54. See supra note 52.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). Section 1 provides in part: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States . ..is declared to be illegal." Id; see supra note 17 (text of § 2).
The Supreme Court has ruled that refusals to deal, by themselves, do not violate the
antitrust laws. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (no antitrust violation
in a manufacturer's refusal to sell to distributors who failed to charge manufacturer's sug-
gested retail price and in terminating dealers who did not adhere to that price). The
holding in Colgate has been limited by the Court but never overruled. See Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960). Refusals to deal often occur when a company integrates vertically. See supra notes
52-53 and accompanying text. Vertical integration is judged by the same rule of reason
standard as refusals to deal. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525-26
(1948) (it is "clear . .. that vertical integration, as such without more, cannot be held
violative of the Sherman Act. . . . [Tihe extent of permissible integration must be gov-
erned, as other factors in Sherman Act violations, by the other circumstances of individual
cases').
56. In Albrecht, the Court suggested that a § I combination could have been alleged
between the publisher and the parties hired by the publisher to solicit in the plaintiff's
area; between the publisher and other distributors who accepted the maximum price; and
between the publisher and the plaintiff, "at least as of the day he unwillingly complied
with the respondent's advertised price." 390 U.S. at 150 & n.6. In addition, the Court
stated that a combination between the publisher and the plaintiff's customers would not
be a frivolous contention. Id
57. Id at 151-53.
58. See, e.g., Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d 14; Auburn News Co., 659 F.2d 273; Nal, 599 F.2d
335; Knutson, 548 F.2d 795; Nugebauer, 474 F. Supp. 1053; Newberry, 438 F. Supp. 470.
59. See, e.g., Nait, 599 F.2d at 336.
[Vol. I1I
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however, have unanimously rejected this argument.60
Displaced distributors have also alleged that newspaper publish-
ers' refusals to deal constitute monopolization or attempted mo-
nopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.61 The Supreme
Court has identified two elements of a monopolization violation:
"(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident. '6 2 The latter
element demonstrates that monopolization is something more than
just the possession of monopoly power. To monopolize means to
exert some positive drive, apart from competitive skill, to control
the market. 63 To determine whether this positive force is present,
courts must identify a firm's intent.64
The intent requirement of a monopolization violation need not
be proven by demonstrating a specific intent to monopolize.65 A
firm's intent may be inferred from a number of factors. These in-
clude the lack of legitimate business reasons for a course of ac-
tion,66 conduct involving "dirty tricks, '67 or consequences that
appear to be anticompetitive.
60. See supra note 58; see also Knutson, 548 F.2d at 805 ("a complete conversion is not an
enforcement mechanism, but a choice of an alternative form of distribution").
61. See supra note 52.
62. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966). Monopoly power is
defined as "the power to control prices or exclude competition." Id at 571 (quoting
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)). The relevant
market consists of two parts: the relevant product market, id at 571; and the relevant
geographical market. Id at 575-76.
63. A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, supra note 1, at 90-91; see supra note 7; cf Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979) (monopoly power must be
coupled with intent to use power).
64. A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, supra note 1, at 92 ("The principal task of the courts
under § 2 of the Sherman Act in seeking to isolate the element of positive drive which
constitutes monopolizing is to identify the intent of the firm").
65. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); see also A. NEALE & D.
GOYDER, supra note 1, at 92-93 ("A firm's intent may be made manifest by its particular
acts or by its general course of action").
66. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375
(1927) (affirming jury verdict finding Kodak guilty ot monopolization after Kodak refused
to deal with competing distributors); Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp.,
431 F.2d 334, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971) (refusal to deal not
motivated by legitimate business reasons).
67. See, e.g., Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 853-54 (6th Cir. 1979) ("dirty
tricks" included removal and covering up plaintiff's periodicals on sales racks, pricing be-
low cost in magazines which competed with the plaintiff, and intimidation of plaintiff's
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It is this final area-the measuring of possible anticompetitive
effects-that courts often focus on to determine whether vertical
integration and a refusal to deal by a monopolist violate section
2.68 Courts and commentators have pointed to both positive and
negative effects that may result from a monopolist's vertical inte-
gration. Positive effects include integration efficiences, 69 better ser-
vice, and lower prices. 70  Negative effects include an increased
opportunity for price discrimination,71 increased barriers to entry
at the first level, 72 evasion of government regulation of first level
monopoly profits, 73 elimination of intrabrand price competition,
7 4
68. See Paschall, 727 F.2d at 698-704; Auburn News Co., 659 F.2d at 278; Byars, 609 F.2d
at 861.
69. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 725d n.7 (1978). Integration
efficiencies result when, because of technologically complementary production methods, it
is less costly to produce the same output with one integrated operation than with separate
operations. Id; Note, Refusal to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolsts, 87 HARV. L. REv.
1720, 1730-31 (1974). For example, a newspaper that uses computers for word processing
may also be able to use its computers to store subscription lists, keep track of billing, and
other distribution operations. But "replacement of small, independent businesses with a
single firm may conflict with the Sherman Act's concern for widespread dispersal of eco-
nomic power." Id at 1730.
70. The positive effects of vertical integration are particularly likely to result when
vertical integration occurs between monopolists at different levels. The positive effects
occur since there is only one monopoly profit that can be made from the sale of a product.
This profit depends solely on the product's demand curve and the firm's production costs.
See Note, supra note 69, at 1731. Where the stages below the monopolist are competitive,
the monopolist is able to extract the full monopoly profit from the product at his level.
Nevertheless, where, as in the newspaper industry, the stage below the monopolist is also a
monopoly, the monopoly profit will have to be shared between the two monopolies. If
because of misinformation or bargaining difficulties a rational agreement is not made, the
result will likely be a price higher than the optimal monopoly price. This happens be-
cause both monopolists will be tempted to price high in order to maximize their shares of
the monopoly profit, with the final price to the consumer higher than what would be
charged if only one monopolist had set the price. Most courts and commentators agree,
therefore, that vertical integration between monopolies benefits both producers and con-
sumers. See, e.g., Byars, 609 F.2d at 861; III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 69, at
I 725c; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
300-01 (2d ed. 1980); Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE
L.J. 1, 15 n.62, 17 n.72 (1959); Note, supra note 69, at 1731.
71. See, e.g., Paschall, 727 F.2d at 702; Byars, 609 F.2d at 861; P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 22, at $ 729.4b4; F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 305 n.14; Note, supra note
69, at 1727-28.
72. See, e.g., Paschall, 727 F.2d at 702; Byars, 609 F.2d at 861; P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 22, at 729.4b7; Kessler & Stern, supra note 70, at 16-21; Note, supra note
69, at 1728; cf. III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 69, at 725h (adverse effects
uncertain even with full integration of successive monopolies).
73. See, e.g., Paschall, 727 F.2d at 702; Byars, 609 F.2d at 861.
74. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 22, at 729.4b2. Of course, where deal-
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and decreased incentive for innovation.75 Courts balance the posi-
tive and negative effects that result from integration with other
evidence of intent, such as alleged business reasons for the move, to
determine whether a monopolization violation has occurred. 7
6
Displaced distributors have also claimed that a newspaper's ver-
tical integration constitutes an attempt to monopolize under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. 77 An attempt to monopolize consists of
two elements: (1) a specific intent by the defendant to monopolize;
and (2) a dangerous probability that a monopoly will result from
the defendant's conduct.7" The specific intent requirement of the
attempt offense, like the general intent requirement of the monop-
olization offense, must be inferred from conduct. 79 The inference
of intent, however, must be more obvious and less ambiguous in an
attempt violation than in a monopolization violation.8o
Displaced distributors have yet to succeed under any of these
75. See F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 438. But see III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 69, at 7 2 5g (significant adverse effects uncertain because monopolist can still in-
crease profits by innovation).
76. See, e.g., Byars, 609 F.2d at 860-64. Problems exist in identifying situations where
the vertical integration scheme is anticompetitive. Id. at 861. In Byars, a newspaper im-
posed a service charge on small retailers, claiming that it was too expensive to distribute
through them. Id at 847. The retailers claimed antitrust violations on the basis of the
newspaper's refusal to deal with the retailers. See id. at 846. The court remanded the issue
for further factfinding to determine whether the newspaper had violated § I by its refusal
to deal. Id. at 864.
77. See, e.g., Auburn News Co., 659 F.2d 273 (small distributors challenged company's
choice of direct distribution); Naify, 599 F.2d 335 (retailers terminated in favor of salaried
employees); Knutson, 548 F.2d 795 (distributors challenged publisher's termination of in-
dependent distribution system); Neugebauer, 474 F. Supp. at 1061 (alleging that publisher's
ability to control retail and wholesale prices created price squeeze eliminating wholesale
market).
78. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) (char-
acterizing monopolization as combination or conspiracy to acquire and maintain the
power to exclude competitors to a substanial extent); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (intent essential to characterize an attempt as § 2 violation). This
classic interpretation of the attempt offense has been often criticized. See P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 22, at I 729.5d ("judicial discussions of intention are disappointing");
Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of
Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373, 384-88 (1974); Hawk, Attempts to Monopohze--Specific
Intent as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machne, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1973) (historical
background of judicial treatment of the Sherman Act).
79. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
80. Knutson, 548 F.2d at 813-15. In Knutson, the court held that intent under an at-
tempt violation required: (1) specific intent, and (2) some illegal or predatory activity
from which specific intent can be inferred. Id at 814. "Where the conduct is justified by
legitimate business reasons or merely exemplifies a healthy spirit of competitition, an in-
tent to monopolize is more difficult to'support." Id
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theories., In Paschalv. Kansas City Star Co.,8 2 however, distributors
received their most complete hearing to date, and nearly prevailed
as a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in their favor.8 3 Nevertheless, the independent distributors
were denied victory because the Eighth Circuit agreed to rehear
the case en banc and overruled the earlier panel opinion. 4 Paschall
fully presents the positions of both sides in the vertical integration
debate, 5 and illustrates the disputes among jurists about the goals
of antitrust.
III. THE PASCHALL DECISION
The defendant Kansas City Star Company publishes the only
daily metropolitan newspapers in the Kansas City, Missouri, and
Kansas City, Kansas area.8 6 The Star's monopoly position, how-
ever, was obtained in part by predatory practices that led to its
conviction for monopolization and attempted monopolization in
1957.87 For most of its history, the Star's newspapers were distrib-
uted by independent distributors who purchased newspapers
wholesale from the Star and resold them to the public at varying
retail prices. 8 Each independent distributor served an exclusive
area as defined by the distributor's contract with the Star.8 9
Although distributors did not compete against each other, the Star
reserved the right to sell papers directly to anyoneY° The Star sel-
dom exercised that right,9' but evidence illustrated that the news-
81. See supra note 52 (cases in which distributors have alleged antitrust violations).
82. 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), appeal
docketed, No. 83-2001 (Sup. Ct. June 5, 1984).
83. 695 F.2d at 323.
84. 727 F.2d 692.
85. The positions in the Paschall opinions are frankly discussed because each side
wrote dissenting opinions. See supra note 16.
86. The Star publishes a morning paper, The Kansas City Times, an evening paper, The
Kansas City Star, and a Sunday paper, The Sunday Star. Paschall, 695 F.2d at 325.
87. Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957).
88. 727 F.2d at 694. The retail prices were established by the carriers evt- though
the Star had, in the past, exerted some control over the retail prices set by the carriers. Id
at 694. The wholesale price was set by the Star. Id Originally, the wholesale price was
calculated as a percentage of each delivered wholesale copy. This was later changed to a
percentage of the retail price charged by the carriers. Id.
89. Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 441 F. Supp. 349, 365 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (repro-
duction of contract).
90. Id The contract reserved the Star's right "to sell newspapers to others anywhere
along [a particular] route." Id.
91. The Star exercised its right to sell to other distributors on at least one occasion,
but the practice was so rare that it had a de minimis impact on the distribution system.
[Vol. I1I
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paper's presence on the edge of the market had a retardant effect
on prices.
92
In 1974, the Star notified its distributors that it was considering
altering its distribution methods. 93 The plaintiff, Paschall, who
had invested substantial sums in his route,94 initiated a lawsuit
challenging the legality of a distribution change. 95 In 1977, after a
change in ownership, the Star announced that it would terminate
all contracts with its independent carriers and replace them with
delivery agents. 96 The Star also announced that it would refuse to
sell newspapers wholesale to anyone. 97 The Star claimed that the
new delivery system would allow it to set uniform prices for its
papers and provide more responsive service. 9 The Star offered all
existing independent distributors the opportunity to become deliv-
ery agents, and promised that delivery agents would earn approxi-
mately the same amount as the contract carriers had earned.99
In response to the Star's actions, the plaintiff, along with 250
other independent distributors, obtained a preliminary injunction
preventing the Star from implementing the new system.100 After a
trial on the merits, the district court concluded that the Star's ver-
695 F.2d at 325. The one occasion on which the Star exercised this right is referred to as
the "Louisberg Square" incident. 727 F.2d at 699. In this incident, an independent dis-
tributor raised its retail subscription price to readers in the Louisberg Square apartment
complex. The Star responded to the disgruntled readers by delivering the newspapers to
them directly at a lower price. Id
92. 727 F.2d at 699. The district court found that the mere presence of the Star "as a
potential competitor in the retail market produced a substantial retardant effect on the
contract carriers' prices and gave the contract carriers a significant incentive to provide
the best service possible." Id
93. Id at 695. The Star sent a letter to each carrier indicating it might change its
method of distribution. Id Thereafter, the Star required new carriers to sign a contract
acknowledging that the carrier had read and understood the letter establishing the new
policy. 695 F.2d at 325.
94. 727 F.2d at 695. The right to deliver papers on existing routes carried a signifi-
cant market value. The court stated that:
When a contract carrier decided to leave the business, the contract carrier would
'sell' its route to its successor. If Star Co. approved, the route purchaser would
then enter into a new contract with Star Co. and become that route's new con-
tract carrier. Prices for routes sold in this manner ranged into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars for the largest routes.
Id
95. 695 F.2d at 325. The plaintiffs in Paschall moved for a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction. Id
96. Id
97. Id
98. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 695.
99. Id
100. Paschall, 441 F. Supp. 349.
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tical integration into the distribution area, coupled with its refusal
to deal with contract carriers, violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act' 0 1 since the new system permitted the Star to extend its mo-
nopoly into the distribution market. 10 2 The district court perma-
nently enjoined the Star from refusing to deal with the contract
carriers 10 3 and awarded the plaintiffs $2.5 million in attorneys'
fees. 104
On appeal, a divided three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the injunction. 0 5 The majority stated that a section 2
violation consists of: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market; and (2) the use of that power to foreclose compe-
tition, gain a competitive advantage, or destroy a competitor.
0 6
Since the Star conceded that it had monopoly power in the rele-
vant market, 10 7 the court turned its attention to the second ele-
ment.108 The court stated that the second element of a section 2
violation would be established if it were shown that the Star's ver-
tical integration resulted in "substantial anticompetitive effects
that are not offset by production economies, savings in market
transaction costs, or other competitive benefits."' 1 9 The court be-
gan by addressing the Star's claim that economic theory demon-
strated that the vertical integration would not produce
anticompetitive effects."10 The majority recognized that, accord-
ing to the optimal monopoly pricing theory,"' a monopolist can-
101. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); see supra note 17 (text of§ 2).
102. 695 F.2d at 326.
103. Id
104. Id at 336.
105. Id. at 334-35. The court also reduced the award of attorneys' fees. Id at 338.
106. Id at 326 (citing 3 VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULA-
TION 8.02[1] (Supp. 1981)); see also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948);
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
107. Paschall, 695 F.2d at 326-27. The relevant market consisted of two parts: the
product market, which the district court found to be metropolitan daily newspapers sold
at wholesale; and the geographic market, which was found to be the seven county metro-
politan area of Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri. Id.
108. Id at 327. Since monopolization under § 2 requires more than the possession of
monopoly power, the court could not find the Star guilty of a § 2 violation simply because
it possessed monopoly power. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
429-30 (2d Cir. 1948).
109. 695 F.2d at 327 (citing Auburn News Co., 659 F.2d at 278; Byars, 609 F.2d at 859-
63).
110. d. at 328. In addition to economic theory, the court considered factual evidence
which contradicted the contention that the proposed integration would result in more
efficient distribution, lower prices, and superior service. Id. at 328-29.
111. Id. at 328. The court described the theory as follows:
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not extract a double monopoly profit by integrating forward.' 1 2 It
also recognized, however, that certain anticompetitive effects can
result from vertical integration.11 3 These included the opportunity
for price and service discrimination, higher barriers to entry at the
first level, evasion of government regulation of monopoly profits at
the first level, and increased exploitation of the monopolist's first
level market power.1 14 The court also noted studies suggesting
that a monopolist is less innovative or efficient than a firm moti-
vated by economic pressures. 115
The court held that the Star's vertical integration and refusal to
deal would produce several anticompetitive effects. The court ob-
served that, under the independent distributor system, the Star's
presence as a potential competitor had a retardant effect on prices
and services offered by the independent carriers.' 16 Under the new
system, however, this beneficial effect was eliminated by the loss of
distributors, and this elimination contributed to increased prices
Under any given cost and demand conditions, there is a single price which will
maximize a monopolist's profit. If the monopolist charges more than the 'profit-
maximizing' price, its profit will be less than optimal because the decrease in
revenue from reduced sales, due to the higher price, will exceed the increase in
revenue from the higher price. Moreover, a monopolist can extract its maximum
monopoly profit only once from the sale of any given end product. If a monopo-
list attempts to increase that profit by integrating forward and charging a higher
retail price, it will be unsuccessful because, again, the decline in revenue from
the decreased demand will exceed the increase from the higher price. Conse-
quently, a monopolist cannot increase its profits by integrating forward unless it
can directly distribute its product at a lower cost than the independent
distributors.
Id. (citing III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 69, at $$ 725-26; R. BORK, supra note 7,
at 242-43; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMic NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS
704-08 (1974)).
112. Id. at 328.
113. Id; see Note, supra note 69, at 1727-30.
114. 695 F.2d at 328; see Note, supra note 69, at 1727-30.
115. 695 F.2d at 328 (citing Note, supra note 69, at 1730 & n.62).
116. Id at 329. Both the panel opinion and the en banc opinion made use of the
potential competitor doctrine. The en banc decision described the doctrine as follows:
It is said that a potential competitor, merely by its presence at the edge of the
market, will have a retardant effect on price and will provide an incentive for
better service among those already in the market. This is so because if the ex-
isting market competitors practice price gouging or provide inferior service, the
potential competitor will enter the competitive fray with lower prices and better
service, thereby capturing a substantial share of the market. To avoid the possi-
bility of losing business to the potential competitor, the actual market competi-
tors will maintain low prices and quality service. Thus, should the potential
competitor merge with an existing market competitor, the market will lose the
procompetitive effect of the presence of a potential competitor.
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and lower service." 7 The court noted that prices had already
risen" 18 and service options had fallen' 9 in areas where the Star
had instituted the new system.
The court also relied on testimony and internal Star memo-
randa indicating that the Star did not believe it could deliver pa-
pers more efficiently under its new system.120  Rather than more
efficient delivery services, the Star's motivation may have been to
increase its profits by eliminating retailers' profits.' 2' Finally, the
court indicated that the elimination of independent carriers would
contravene the goal of antitrust "to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses."'' 22
In his dissent, Judge Henley took issue with the majority's re-
fusal to give due weight to the finding by the district court that the
Star was motivated by legitimate reasons. 23 Judge Henley also
expressed concerned over the majority's finding that the Star's ver-
tical integration would produce anticompetitive effects. 24  Be-
cause the district court had not found that the Star's vertical
integration would allow price discrimination, first level entry bar-
riers, or evasion of first level monopoly profits regulation, 25 Judge
117. 695 F.2d at 329-31.
118. Id. at 330. The Star announced a uniform subscription price rate of $6.00 a
month for a full subscription and $5.00 a month for split subscriptions. Id These rates
were higher than those charged by most distributors, although some distributors did
charge higher rates. Id. The prior monthly rates ranged from $3.50 and $6.00 for a full
subscription, and from $2.85 to $5.85 for a split subscription. Id.
119. Id at 330-31. Subscription, billing, and credit arrangements were more limited
under the Star's system than under the independent distributor system. Id In addition,
the number of deliveries to certain country routes were decreased from twice a day under
the independent distributor system to once a day under the agent system. Id at 331.
120. Id at 331-32.
121. Id Plaintiffs expert testified that direct delivery would give the Star "maximum
control of price," and enable it to increase profits from advertising and subscriptions. Id.
at 332.
122. Id (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962)).
123. Id at 339-40 (Henley, J., dissenting). The district court found that:
The new system would give the company control over pricing to the subscriber,
thereby being able to advertise subscription prices, which is quite impossible
where carriers largely determine the ultimate specific prices. It would permit the
company to assure more rapid 'starts' for new subscribers, and would allow uni-
form policy regarding time of collection, manner of payment by customers, and
methods of responding to customer complaints, all of which have been problems
under the independent contract carrier system.
Id at 331 n.12. While the majority did not find these findings inaccurate, it found that
they did not fully represent the Star's reasons for integrating forward. Id
124. Id. at 340.
125. Id at 340-41. These three situations have been identified by the Sixth Circuit as
situations where a monopolist may seek to vertically integrate even if integration would be
less efficient than the system it replaced. Byars, 609 F.2d at 860-61.
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Henley did not believe that the change in delivery systems would
lead to anticompetitive effects.' 26 Furthermore, no evidence of
"dirty tricks," which other courts had used to find antitrust viola-
tions, had been found in the present case.' 27 Judge Henley em-
phasized that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove an antitrust
violation and not on the defendant to disprove a violation. 28
Judge Henley also disagreed with the majority that the possibil-
ity of higher prices and fewer service options outweighed the bene-
fits to customers of uniform prices and services.' 29 He noted that
the Star's uniform price was within the range of what some distrib-
utors charged, and that the rise in prices may have been partially
necessitated by general economic conditions.' 30 He also empha-
sized that numerous courts have allowed newspapers to move to
self-distribution without imposing antitrust liability.
13
Finally, Judge Henley noted that the effect of the majority deci-
sion would be to "protect the market value of the independent
carrier routes by prohibiting the Star from exercising its bar-
gained-for contractual right of termination."'' 32 Such a result, ac-
cording to the dissent, was not intended by the Sherman Act.'
33
On the Star's petition, the Eighth Circuit reconsidered the case
en banc and overruled the panel decision. As in the panel opinions,
the en bane court focused on whether the Star's vertical integration
would lead to unreasonable anticompetitive effects. 134 The court
126. 695 F.2d at 342.
127. Id at 341 (citing Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 803 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977)). Judge Henley claimed that by offering the in-
dependent distributors the opportunity to negotiate alternative contracts with comparable
income, the Star was acting in good faith. Id
128. Id Judge Henley thought that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof
in this case. Id
129. Id at 341-42. Judge Henley noted that the panel decision did not adequately
discuss the options available to customers on various individual routes and the options
offered by the Star. Id
130. Id
131. Id at 342.
132. Id at 343.
133. Id
134. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 701-04. Unlike the panel opinion, the en banc court consid-
ered whether the Star was guilty of an attempt to monopolize under § 2. Id at 695-701.
The court stated that the Star could be found guilty of an attempted monopolization if it
had a specific intent to monopolize. The court found that the Star's legitimate business
reasons for integrating, see supra note 123, negated any liability based on specific intent.
727 F.2d at 696-98.
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used both the optimal monopoly pricing theory 135 and the poten-
tial competitor doctrine1 36 in evaluating the competitive effects of
the integration. It concluded, however, that the negative effects of
integration would not outweigh the positive effects. 137 The major-
ity followed the reasoning of Judge Henley in his panel dissent
138
in holding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving an antitrust
violation. 139 The majority found that no price discrimination, in-
creased first level entry barriers, or evasion of government regula-
tion would result from the Star's vertical integration.1 40  It also
found that other courts had upheld newspapers' forward integra-
tions and refusals to deal. 14 1 In addition, the court emphasized the
important role of advertising on the Star's distribution policies.
Because the Star's advertising revenues depended on its circula-
tion, the Star would continue to have a strong incentive to main-
tain low prices and responsive service.
142
Two separate dissents emphasized the points made by the ma-
jority in the panel opinion. Judge Heaney pointed to the probable
increase in price and decrease in service options under the new
system as an important anticompetitive effect.143 He asserted that
other cases in which discharged distributors had failed to prove
antitrust violations against vertically integrating publishers were
distinguishable from Paschall for two reasons. Paschall was the only
case where the publisher had been previously convicted of monop-
olization, and the distributors had proven that the new system
would not be more efficient than the old. 144 Judge Heaney and
Judge Bright, in a separate dissent, 45 both declared that the elimi-
nation of numerous independent distributors by vertical integra-
tion contradicted the antitrust objectives of decentralization and
135. 727 F.2d at 700-01; see supra note III (en banc court's description of the optimal
monopoly price theory).
136. 727 F.2d at 699-700; see supra note 116 (discussion of the potential competitor
doctrine).
137. 727 F.2d at 704.
138. 695 F.2d at 339 (Henley, J., dissenting).
139. 727 F.2d at 704.
140. Id at 702.
141. Id at 704. The court stated, "[W]e find it hard to ignore the fact that every other
antitrust case brought against a newspaper publisher challenging the newspaper's decision
to forwardly integrate into distribution has been resolved in favor of the newspaper." Id
(citations omitted).
142. Id at 701.
143. Id at 704-05 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
144. Id at 705.
145. Id at 706 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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protection of small businesses.1 46 Judge Bright also asserted that
the burden of proof should be shifted in this situation, so that a
monopolist would only be allowed to integrate vertically by refus-
ing to deal with its independent distributors if it could demon-
strate that lower transaction costs or greater production economies
would result.1
4 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PASCHALL DECISION
The Paschall court discussed a number of issues often raised in
vertical integration cases. The court considered the extent of the
Star's monopoly power, 148 the economic theories of potential com-
petition and optimal monopoly pricing, 49 and the competitive ef-
fects of the Star's integration. 150 In the context of these issues,
both the majority and the dissents espoused their views concerning
the goals of antitrust in vertical integration.151 The positions taken
by the majority and dissents reveal a tension among the members
of the court concerning the goals of antitrust. This tension, as well
as the other differences in the opinions, are examined below.
A. The Star's Monopoly Power
Monopoly power has been defined as "the power to control
prices or exclude competition."' 152 Although courts often infer mo-
nopoly power from a large share of the market,153 the correlation is
not perfect. 154 Producers with a predominant share of the market
may not always be able to control the price of their goods. 155 This
146. See id. at 706-07.
147. Id at 706.
148. See in/ra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
149. See i'n/fa notes 168-200 and accompanying text.
150. See zn/fa notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
151. See zn/fa notes 210-35 and accompanying text.
152. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (citing United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
153. Id
154. See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 457. Although large market share is not always
a proxy for monopoly power, there may be concerns about a newspaper's possession of a
large market share that are unrelated to the dangers of the power to control price. A fear
commonly expressed is that increased concentration in the newspaper industry may in-
hibit the free exchange of ideas. See B. COMPAINE, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA 42-46 (1979)
(discussing argument that concentration in the newspaper industry produces inferior jour-
nalism); Roberts, supra note 36, at 322 (antitrust laws should be enforced in newspaper
industry to promote both industrial efficiency and free speech); Note, Monopoly Newspapers.:
Troubles in Paradise, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 268, 287 (1970) (powerful interests in newspaper
industry have the potential to control free exchange of ideas).
155. See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 457.
1985]
21
Andres: Refusals To Deal by Vertically Integrating Newspaper Monopolists:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
was the case in Paschall.
A monopolist has the power to control price if its pricing policy
revolves around its production costs and the demand for its goods,
rather than around the prices set by its competitors. 156 Under mo-
nopoly conditions, the monopolist is able to increase profits by
pricing higher and reducing output. 15 7 In competitive markets,
however, producers must consider the prices charged by competi-
tors when setting prices for their goods.' 58 If the market is compet-
itive, competitive pressures force producers to increase output and
decrease price more than in a monopoly market. 59
Although the Star had a predominant market share of the daily
newspaper market,1 60 this was not the salient concern in determin-
ing whether the Star would actually charge a monopoly price.
The Star's power over advertising must also be considered. As
noted above, the Star sold a joint product, news copy and advertis-
ing space.' 6' Because the Star obtained a greater portion of its
revenues from advertising than from the sale of papers, 162 its pric-
ing strategies were dictated more by the effect of those strategies
on advertising revenues than on revenues from the sale of papers.
Since advertising revenues tend to decrease as a newspaper raises
its price,163 the Star had little incentive to exercise its monopoly
power to raise prices.
This principle would hold true even if the Star had monopoly
power in the advertising market as well as the copy market.
64
156. See supra note 32 (definition of monopoly power).
157. Id
158. Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 454. A producer in a competitive market cannot
afford to ignore the prices of his competitors; if he did, he would likely lose sales as custom-
ers switched to the less expensive product. Id
159. See Kamerschen, supra note 32, at 1062.
160. Paschall, 695 F.2d at 326-27. The district court characterized the product market
as metropolitan daily newspapers sold at wholesale, and concluded that other media such
as suburban newspapers, shoppers, handbills, radio, and television differ in purpose, con-
tent, and technique, thus constituting separate markets. Id at 326 n.4; cf. B. OWEN, supra
note 34, at 50-52. Owen suggests that electronic and suburban print media compete "at
the fringes and between [the] layers" against large metropolitan newspapers thus provid-
ing these larger papers with a degree of market discipline. Id at 52.
161. See supra notes 35, 142 and accompanying text.
162. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 703.
163. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
164. Studies show that a newspaper's power in the advertising market depends on
whether the advertiser is a national or local advertiser. National, brand-name advertisers
usually compete in large geographic markets and are able to select among competing
forms of media. Local advertisers, on the other hand, are often limited to the geographic
markets where they can compete and to the types of media they will find cost effective.
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Monopoly power in the advertising market would allow the Star
to increase its profits by reducing its advertising volume below
competitive levels.' 65 For the reasons mentioned above, however,
the Star would have no incentive to raise the prices of newspapers.
Since the majority of the Star's profits come from advertising,
66
the incremental gain to the Star from setting a monopoly price in
the copy market would be offset by the loss of advertising profits
resulting from a lower copy volume.' 67 Thus, the ability of the
Star to use its monopoly power in the copy market is questionable.
The dissents' focus on the increased price of the newspaper due
to the Star's vertical integration is, therefore, misplaced. The Star
would not want to increase its copy price even if it had a monop-
oly in both the copy and advertising markets. To do so would
mean lower profits in its primary business of advertising and,
therefore, lower profits overall.
B. Economic Theory in Paschall: Optimal Monopoly Pricing Theor v.
Potential Competitor Doctrine
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Paschall relied on
an economic theory to support their views. The majority em-
ployed the optimal monopoly pricing theory,'1 while the dissent-
ers employed the potential competitor doctrine. 69 Analysis of
Thus, newspapers will usually compete heavily with other media for national advertisers.
Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 458-59; see also Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence
Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1982) (no alternative is "reasonably interchangeable"
with the daily newspaper for classified rental advertising).
Although it would seem that the lower demand elasticity for local business would
allow the paper to charge higher rates to local advertisers than to national advertisers, the
opposite is usually true. This is because local advertisers actually contribute to circula-
tion-i.e., people buy papers for the rental listings, the grocery specials, the movie sched-
ules, etc. Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 458-59; see also Barber, Newspaper Monopo' in New
Orleans. The Lessonsfor Anlitrust Pohy, 24 LA. L. REv. 503, 515 (1964) (New Orleans news-
paper charges national advertisers a higher advertising rate).
165. See supra note 32.
166. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 39.
168. 727 F.2d at 700-03. The majority in the panel decision also employed the poten-
tial competitor doctrine. It affirmed the district court's conclusion that the independent
distributors reasonably believed that the Star was a potential competitor, and that this
had a retardant effect on retail prices. 695 F.2d at 392. The panel majority also found
support for the district court's finding that the Star's refusal to sell to the independent
distributors would eliminate the retardant effect. Id; see supra note 111 (explanation of
optimal monopoly pricing theory).
169. 727 F.2d at 704-05 (Heaney, J., dissenting), 706 (Bright, J., dissenting); see supra
note 116 (explanation of potential competitor doctrine). Judge Bright believed that the
majority decision permits "a monopolist to destroy hundreds of independent businesses."
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these theories illustrates that the majority properly relied on the
optimal monopoly pricing theory.
1. Optinal Monopoly Pricing Theory
The optimal monopoly pricing theory 70 attempts to dispel the
notion that a monopolist can increase his monopoly profits at the
expense of consumers by integrating forward and monopolizing
the next stage of production. 71 The amount of monopoly profit a
monopolist can acquire depends on the cost and demand curves
for the product rather than on the number of monopolized stages
of production. 72 A monopolist, therefore, cannot extract an "ex-
tra" monopoly profit by integrating into the distribution level. 73
Only one monopoly profit can be attained within the entire pro-
duction and distribution scheme. 174 Thus, assuming that custom-
ers were charged a monopoly price before the Star's integration,
the price should have remained the same, or decreased, after the
integration.
The dissents in Paschall were skeptical of this theory mainly be-
cause, contrary to what the theory predicts, average newspaper
prices rose after the Star's integration. 175 Four explanations may
be offered for this price increase. First, the increase may have re-
sulted from misinformation or poor business judgment. 76 If so,
the market would discipline the Star, and the error would be self-
correcting. 177 Second, because the Star promised independent dis-
727 F.2d at 706 (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright would have held that a monopolist
"may not integrate vertically by refusing to deal further with its independent distributors
unless [the monopolist] demonstrates that lower transaction costs or greater production
economies will result." Id
170. See supra note 111.
171. See supra note 70.
172. Although vertical integration will not increase the monopoly profit that a manu-
facturer can obtain from consumers, it may allow the manufacturer to obtain a greater
precentage of the profits because the monopoly profit would no longer have to be shared
with the monopolist at the lower level. See Note, supra note 69, at 1725-32.
173. See supra note 70.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
176. The fact that the Star had little experience in setting retail prices supports this
view. Because the Star had recently entered the retail market, it may not have had suffi-
cient information to set prices which would guarantee an optimal rate of return. It might
be expected that the Star would experiment with its pricing before concluding what rate
would produce the highest return. See Paschall, 727 F.2d at 703.
177. The panel court noted that the Star's price increases had already led to decreased
circulation on some routes. Paschall, 695 F.2d at 330. Lower circulation leads to both
lower subscription and advertising profits. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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tributors that they would earn approximately the same income as
agents as they had earned as independent carriers, the integration
probably did not produce savings that could be passed on to con-
sumers.' 78 The cost of instituting the new system, however, may
have been passed on to consumers by way of a price increase.
Third, it is possible that when production and distribution were
separated the parties erroneously set prices too low to earn the full
monopoly profit, and a price increase was necessary to correct
this.' 79 Finally, the price increase may have been due to factors
unrelated to the vertical integration.' 80
Evidence in Paschall also indicated a slight decrease in service
options.' 8 ' This evidence, however, was unclear. Although the op-
tions for some customers decreased, they increased for others.'
8 2
Some service decreases may have been mandated by the decision
to institute a uniform price. The decreased deliveries to country
routes from twice daily to once daily'8 3 would have been justified
if the new uniform subscription rate could not adequately cover
the costs of two country deliveries.'
8 4
While the dissenters were skeptical about the optimal monopoly
pricing theory, the majority properly applied it in this case. The
initial increase in price after the Star implemented its uniform
price was not due to the Star's monopoly power in the copy mar-
ket. Lack of information, a promise to keep distributors' income at
These lower revenues would presumably prompt an effort to raise circulation by decreas-
ing prices.
178. Because the Star probably experienced competitive pressures with respect to ad-
vertising, distributors were probably able to share with the Star a substantial portion of
the Star's monopoly profits. This is indicated by the high market value of the routes. See
supra note 94. Although integration would be expected to give the Star the full monopoly
profit, a large portion may remain with the distributors because of their frozen wages.
179. This analysis assumes that the lower price was due to error rather than competi-
tive pressure, and that the price would likely have risen even if the operations had re-
mained separate.
180. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 703. But see id. at 705 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (no evidence in
record that the price increase was due to a general increase in costs).
181. 695 F.2d at 330-31. The panel majority stated that eliminating the independent
distributors caused a decrease in services such as subscription options, billing, and credit
arrangements. Id.
182. 727 F.2d at 703-04.
183. Id. at 703; 695 F.2d at 331. The Star's justification for decreasing its deliveries to
country routes was that it could not economically deliver twice per day "on certain coun-
try routes at this particular time." 695 F.2d at 331.
184. It is arguable that consumers are worse off by not having the option of paying a
higher rate and receiving two deliveries, but this criticism is more properly directed to-
wards the merits of establishing uniform prices.
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a certain level, and factors unrelated to the integration could ex-
plain the increase in price of the newspaper. Similarly, the slight
decrease in overall services was due to implementation of a uni-
form price rather than the Star's monopoly power.
2. Potential Competitor Doctrine
The Paschall court also applied the potential competitor doc-
trine8 5 in evaluating the effects of the Star's integration. 86 The
doctrine arose in the area of merger law, and has been used to
determine whether mergers violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.
8 7
The doctrine theorizes that the presence of a potential competitor,
such as the Star, has the effect of keeping prices down. 8 In-
dependent distributors are forced to keep prices low to keep the
potential competitor from entering the market. 8 9 If the potential
competitor merges with another competitor, however, the market
loses the procompetitive effect created by the potential competi-
tor.tg° The panel majority held that the Star's integration would
bring about anticompetitive effects that would outweigh any
procompetitive benefits.' 9 ' The en banc majority disagreed.
192
185. See supra note 116.
186. See 727 F.2d at 702, 704-06.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982); see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S.
602, 623 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-37 (1973);
FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 599-602 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Paschallcourt explained the doctrine's relevance to Star's vertical integration by stat-
ing that the Star's actions were more like the acquisition of another business than an
internal expansion. 727 F.2d at 700 n.7. The court stated, "Under Star Co.'s proposal,
former contract carriers will simply sign new contracts. The contract carriers will con-
tinue to use their own trucks, personnel, and customer lists. Only the label and the ability
to set retail prices have changed." Id
If the Star had actually entered the market and competed against its distributors in
response to a price increase, see supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text, it would have
engaged in nearly the same conduct condemned by the Supreme Court in Albrecht. See
supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. The only difference between Albrecht and the
one occasion when the Star competed with a distributor is that the Star competed directly,
whereas in Albrecht the Herald hired another distributor to compete with the price-hiking
distributor. Compare Paschall, 727 F.2d at 699 with Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 147. Given the
Supreme Court's broad definition of a § I "conspiracy" in Albrecht, this difference would
probably not be relevant. See supra note 56. Neither of the Paschallopinions suggested that
the Star would be guilty of a § I violation by competing with distributors who charged
high prices.
188. 727 F.2d at 699; see supra note 116.
189. 727 F.2d at 699. The majority explained the effect of a potential competitor by
stating that existing businesses will attempt to "avoid the possibility of losing business to
the potential competitor . . . [by] . . . maintain[ing] low prices and quality service." Id
190. Id.
191. Paschall, 695 F.2d at 328-29. The court stated that:
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However applicable the potential competitor doctrine may be in
other areas,1 93 it is of little relevance when evaluating the effects of
vertical integration by an upstream monopolist.94 If the Star had
monopoly power, 95 its status as a potential competitor to the dis-
tributors would not affect the existence of monopoly profits, but
only the division of those profits. The Star's presence on the edge
of the distributor market forced carriers to price lower than they
otherwise would; but assuming that both the Star and the in-
dependent distributors desired to price papers at a level where the
optimal monopoly profit would be earned, the differential from a
lower retail margin would be absorbed by the Star through whole-
sale rate increases rather than being passed on to consumers
through lower prices.'
96
Application of the potential competitor doctrine in this instance
also fails to account for the Star's desire to increase its circulation
in order to raise its advertising revenues.197 The Star became a
potential competitor, and probably took a loss in the process, 98
[The record] shows that the anticompetitive consequences of the Star's proposed
refusal to deal will likely outweigh any competitive benefits. The refusal will
eliminate the Star as a potential competitor in the retail market, will likely result
in higher prices and poorer services to readers, and will not lead to a more effi-
cient delivery system.
Id
192. 727 F.2d at 702.
193. The potential competitor doctrine has been criticized from several perspectives.
See R. POSNER, supra note 7, at 113-25; Brodley, Potential Compeliton Mergers." A Structural
Synthest, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 3-5 (1977).
194. The terms "upstream" and "downstream" refer to the stages of production and
distribution; for example, a manufacturer is "upstream" from a distributor.
195. See supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
196. To illustrate, consider a situation where, because of production costs and demand
patterns, the Star can earn its maximum profit when it sells papers at $.25 a copy. Assum-
ing that the Star's marginal cost is 5.10 per paper, the monopoly profit will be $.15 per
paper. Before the Star begins to act as a potential competitor, the Star and the distribu-
tors divide this 5.15 in some manner-perhaps $.05 for the Star and $.10 for the distribu-
tor. When the Star becomes a potential competitor, the distributor is forced to price his
papers more competitively, reducing his margin from $.10 to 5.08. This $.02 drop, how-
ever, will not go to consumers, but to the Star. Because the price providing optimal mo-
nopoly profit that can be obtained remains the same ($.25), the Star will simply raise its
wholesale rate by 5.02 to absorb the distributor's cut.' Thus the Star's status as a potential
competitor will affect only how the profit is divided, and not the end price of the papers.
But see Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 482 (D.D.C. 1977) (newspa-
per's "retaliatory" price increase to distributor who raised retail subscription rates violates
§ I of the Sherman Act).
197. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 701.
198. Insofar as any given distributorship has natural monopoly characteristics, see supra
notes 28-30 and accompanying text, it could not profitably support more than one distrib-
utor. If the newspaper takes away a portion of the carrier's route:
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primarily because it desired to keep subscription prices low and
circulation high. 99 Even after the Star controlled the distribution
system, the Star would have this incentive. Indeed, direct owner-
ship provides the Star with a more efficient means of ensuring low
prices. 20
0
C Evaluation of Competitive Efcts
The possibility of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects
from the Star's integration was also discussed by the Paschall
court.20 ' Procompetitive effects included efficiency gains in service
and advertising.20 2 Anticompetitive effects included higher prices,
fewer service options, decreased innovation, increased opportunity
for price discrimination, and increased entry barriers at the first
The carrier's costs remain nearly as high as before the entry of competition be-
cause the carrier still must travel the full route to make the remaining deliveries.
As a result of the newspaper's entry, both the newspaper and the independent
carrier are competing in a natural monopoly which, by definition, has room for
only one.
Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 463. Thus the Star could not operate at a profit if it com-
peted with distributors.
199. See Paschall, 727 F.2d at 701. Alternatively, the Star may have become a potential
competitor because it wanted to increase its share of the monopoly profit. See Paschall, 695
F.2d 331-32. The benefit of this action would go to the Star, however, not consumers. See
supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 123.
201. 727 F.2d at 701-05; 695 F.2d at 330-31. Some commentators suggest that courts
should not attempt to measure competitive effects of vertical integration because these
commentators do not perceive the effects to be generally harmful and an attempt to mea-
sure the effects is difficult and time-consuming. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 69, at 726 ("intractable subjects for litigation"); Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theor." I,
65 COLUM. L. REv. 401, 410 (1965); cf R. POSNER, supra note 7, at 113-25 (potential
competitor doctrine should be abandoned because competitive effects cannot be ade-
quately measured). These commentators view vertical integration as presumptively law-
ful, thus placing a heavy burden on those opposing the integration. Other commentators,
who see a greater danger in vertical integration, would not abandon the attempt to mea-
sure competitive effects. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, supra note 5, at 440-58. Courts continue
to attempt to measure competitive effects in vertical integration cases. See, e.g., Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
527-30 (1948); Paschall, 727 F.2d 692; Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir.
1980); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. dented,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
202. See Paschall, 727 F.2d at 697. Under the delivery agent system, the Star could get
an area-wide price and "thus facilitate 'in-paper advertising' " and simplify subscription
collection. Id Also, the Star would be able to assure more "rapid starts for new subscrib-
ers" and possibly be more responsive to customer complaints. Id; see also supra note 70
(integration of bilateral monopolies may produce efficiencies).
[Vol. I11
28




While the procompetitive effects appear certain, the anticompe-
titive effects are mostly speculative. Although the court dismissed
the possibility of price discrimination because of the Star's new
uniform subscription rates, a uniform rate is not necessarily incon-
sistent with price discrimination. 20 4 The majority, however, found
that the Star did not institute the uniform rate in order to discrim-
inate.20 5 The district court found that the Star's vertical integra-
tion would not pose entry barriers at the publishing level.206 The
argument that an integrated Star would be less innovative than
the independent distributors can be discounted for two reasons.
First, the distributors, because of their exclusive territories, faced
few competitive pressures to innovate.20 7 Second, distributors
probably had already developed most opportunities for innova-
tions in delivery systems. While increased subscription costs pro-
vide the most direct evidence of an anticompetitive effect, it is
possible to explain the increases for the reasons mentioned
above. 2 8  In addition, subscription increases were not exorbitant,
the uniform rate being within the range charged by some carri-
ers.209 The en bane majority, therefore, was correct in concluding
that the anticompetitive effects of the Star's vertical integration
and refusal to deal would not outweigh the procompetitive effects
of these actions.
D. The Goals of Antitrust Law
The majority and dissenting opinions in Paschall illustrate the
continuing debate among courts and commentators concerning
203. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 701-04.
204. Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 460 n.36. Assuming that the marginal cost of deliv-
ering papers varied with different geographic locations (an apartment complex compared
to a farm route), a uniform price may be more discriminatory than a price that varied
according to the route. Id
205. 727 F.2d at 702-03. The Star probably instituted the uniform rate because of its
utility for billing, record keeping, and advertising subscriptions. See supra note 123.
206. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 702. The delivery agent contracts expressly allowed distribu-
tors to deliver for other newspapers provided such deliveries did not interrupt the Star's
deliveries. This allowed potential competitors to enter the market under an established
delivery system, eliminating some of the entry barriers. The possibility of impeding new
entry has been regarded by some commentators as the most serious danger of a monopo-
list's vertical integration. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 22, at 729.4b7; Blake &
Jones, supra note 5, at 441; see also Kessler & Stern, supra note 70, at 14-21.
207. See 727 F.2d at 695; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 22, at 729.4b6.
208. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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the goals of the antitrust laws. The en banc majority confined its
discussion to the effects of the Star's integration on competition.
210
These included effects on the competitive process 2t I and on the
price that would be charged for the newspapers. 21 2 The dissenters
did not believe this inquiry adequately encompassed the concerns
addressed by the Sherman Act. Judge Heaney, while also focusing
on these competitive factors,213 considered further the effects of in-
tegration on the industry structure. 21 4 Judge Heaney stated that
the court should also have considered the impact of the Star's inte-
gration on small, locally owned businesses.2t 5 Similarly, Judge
Bright expressed concern for "the American ideal that permits
every person on his or her own initiative to own and operate a
small business," 216 and declared that the burden of proof should be
210. 727 F.2d at 698-704.
211. Id at 701-03. The en banc majority demonstrated its concern for the competitive
process in its consideration of the potential competitor doctrine. The court gave some
weight to the theory, stating that "[i]mplementation of the delivery agent system would
leave only one 'competitor' in the market--Star Co. Thus, the retail market has lost the
beneficial competitive interaction between business entities that the antitrust laws were
enacted to preserve." Id at 702.
212. Id. at 702-03. The majority found that consumers would not be harmed by the
integration because the Star had strong incentives to keep prices low. Id at 702. But see
Paschall, 695 F.2d at 330 & n. 10 (panel majority found the agent delivery scheme would
increase consumer subscription prices).
Strictly speaking, a concern for low prices, insofar as the concern reflects a desire to
prevent the enrichment of monopolists at the expense of consumers, is not an efficiency
concern. "Allocative efficiency" refers to a state where resources are allocated to their best
use in light of consumer wants and the cost of producing and distributing the goods. In
such a state, a consumer's wants are satisfied with the fewest possible resources. When a
monopolist extracts higher than competitive prices from consumers, the efficiency loss is
not the transfer of surplus from consumer to the monopolist, but the waste of resources
because the higher price forces consumers to purchase substitute goods that cost society
more to make. See Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REv. 1140, 1160-61 (1981).
213. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 704-05 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The dissent found that the
competitive process would be hindered by the elimination of a potential competitor and
that consumers would be hurt by higher prices and fewer service options. Id; see also 695
F.2d at 329-31.
214. 727 F.2d at 705-06.
215. Id at 706. Judge Heaney quoted Chief Justice Warren's remarks in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962):
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of via-
ble, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
We must give effect to that decision.
727 F.2d at 706 (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344).
216. Id at 706 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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altered for vertically integrating monopolists. 2 7 A monopolist, ac-
cording to Judge Bright, should not be allowed to vertically inte-
grate by refusing to deal with its independent distributors unless it
can demonstrate that lower transaction costs or greater production
economies will result.
218
The current debate over the goals of the antitrust laws pits those
who advocate that economic efficiency 219 should be the sole goal of
antitrust against those who contend that noneconomic considera-
tions should supplement or override efficiency goals.220 While the
debate continues, a majority of commentators appear to agree that
the legislative history of the antitrust laws suggests that Congress
was not motivated solely by economic concerns. 22 ' Among those
217. 1d
218. Id Judge Bright stated, "Any proposed integration must be 'a good faith effort to
do business in more efficient ways.' " Id. at 706-07 (citing Auburn News Co. v. Providence
Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982)).
219. R. BORK, supra note 7, at 90-91; R. POSNER, supra note 7, at 4; seealso I P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 7, at 103-04 (efficiency should be overriding if not only goal
of antitrust). Those who advocate efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust may not agree on
their definitions of efficiency. See Fox, supra note 212, at 1157-69 (distinguishing three
approaches to economic efficiency: restriction of output, business autonomy, and competi-
tion as process).
220. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, at 3 ("[The efficiency theory] holds up the
image of a comprehensive, rational way to predict the allocation effects of alternative ways
in which markets are structured and alternative ways traders in the market may conduct
themselves. But, like a mirage, the image fades upon close approach to it. The gravest
difficulty is that the standard demonstration about the allocative efficiency of a competi-
tive market over a monopolized one is subject to stringent theoretical conditions which are
never fulfilled in the real world"); Blake & Jones, supra note 5, at 425-27; Fox, supra note
212, at 1178-79 ("If at all feasible, antitrust should reflect in a meaningful way all of its
basic goals, including power dispersion, competitive opportunity, and long-run consumer
satisfaction"); Lande, supra note 7, at 68 (Congress passed antitrust laws to further distrib-
utive economic objectives rather than efficiency objectives); Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1076 (justice should be
consideration of antitrust laws).
221. Among the commentators on this subject, only Judge Bork has argued that the
legislative history of the antitrust laws supports the position that antitrust should be con-
cerned only with allocative efficiency. See Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9J. L. & ECON. 7, 11-14 (1966). Other commentators have argued that Congress was
concerned with a number of goals, including allocative efficiency. Professor Hovenkamp
summarizes:
There is considerable evidence that the historical antitrust movements displayed
great concern for condemning bigness and aggregations of great wealth, for
maintaining easy market entry and viability for small businesses, for preserving
"competition" (without really defining it), and for providing consumers with low
prices. The concept of new welfare loss was too technical to enter into the polit-
ical debates over antitrust policy, and antitrust advocates generally believed that
the goals listed above were consistent with each other.
Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 16-17
(1982) (footnotes omitted); see also I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 7, at 106; Fox,
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who advocate supplementing the antitrust laws with noneconomic
considerations, one often-emphasized goal is the preservation of
the competitive process. 222 Proponents of this goal advocate en-
forcing the antitrust laws to ensure that market conditions allow
vigorous competition among rivals.223 Entry barriers must be kept
low to allow fellow competitors, rather than the government, to
discipline slacking businesses. 224 An environment of vigorous com-
petition in turn promotes efficiency and innovation.
225
Vertical integration by newspapers with large market shares,
like the Star, can potentially raise entry barriers and thereby en-
danger the opportunity for competition. 226 Entry barriers would
be raised if competing publishers were precluded by the Star's in-
tegration from using an existing distribution system and were
forced to enter the market at both the publishing and distribution
levels in order to compete with the existing paper. Commentators
disagree about the anticompetitive impact exclusive distribution
systems have on the newspaper industry.227 In Paschall this prob-
lem was avoided by a provision in the distributors' contract which
stated that they were free to deliver other newspapers provided
supra note 212, at 1146-55; Lande, supra note 7, at 105-06; Pitofsky, supra note 220, at 1060-
65. The legislative history of the antitrust laws passed after the Sherman Act, see supra
note 1, demonstrates a concern for non-efficiency values. Hovenkamp, supra, at 18-19
("To ascribe to the legislative histories of the antitrust laws an exclusive concern with
allocative efficiency is to take an extraordinarily narrow and unrealistic view of the polit-
ical process in our congressional system"). Supreme Court opinions have also stated that
the antitrust laws were intended to accomplish a variety of goals. See, e.g., Northern Pac.
Rail Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (The Sherman Act "rests on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material pro-
gress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic social institutions").
222. See Fox, supra note 212, at 1169, 1174-75. Fox states that "[preserving the compet-
itive process] does not focus on consumer surplus, marginal cost, or welfare loss. It centers,
rather, on the environment that is conducive to vigorous rivalry and in turn . . . to effi-
ciency and progressiveness." Id. at 1169.
223. Id.
224. See Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 382-83 (1965)
(self-policing markets a main goal of antitrust).
225. Id; Fox, supra note 212, at 1169; see also supra note 222.
226. See supra note 206; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
227. Compare Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 465 n.55 (because entry into the distribu-
tion market does not require significant capital investment, exclusive distribution in the
newspaper industry does not create high entry barriers) with B. OWEN, supra note 34, at 55,
and Roberts, supra note 36, at 326-27 (creation of separate newspaper distribution system
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such delivery did not disrupt delivery of the Star's papers.228 This
practice appears to preclude the dangers of vertical integration
without inhibiting any of the legitimate benefits.
229
The Paschall dissents reflect a concern for individual entrepre-
neurship and preservation of small businesses. 230 The view that
antitrust law should be used to decentralize economic power in
spite of costs to consumers, however, has few advocates today.23'
Even advocates of noneconomic goals emphasize that smallness for
its own sake or protectionist measures for small businesses are not
proper antitrust objectives. 232 The dissenters appear to have
adopted a protectionist stance toward small businesses that is in-
consistent with other antitrust goals.
23 3
The Paschall majority, however, demonstrated a more proper
228. 727 F.2d at 702; see supra note 206 and accompanying text.
229. Prohibiting exclusive distribution systems would probably cement the monopoly
positions of newspaper distributors because a new newspaper entrant would hot be likely
to set up its own distribution system if an existing system were available. If the new en-
trant were prevented from using the existing distribution system, however, it would be
forced to set up its own system that would compete with the existing distribution system.
See Roberts, supra note 36, at 326-27. Because of the natural monopoly characteristics of
newspaper routes, it is questionable whether competing systems would be efficient. See
supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
230. 727 F.2d at 704 (Heaney, J., dissenting), 706 (Bright, J., dissenting).
231. Fox, supra note 212, at 1142-43 & n.8. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black
and Douglas were particularly notable in stressing power dispersion as the primary goal of
antitrust. See, e.g., Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344. This emphasis on deconcentration dimin-
ished in Supreme Court opinions in the 1970's. Fox, supra note 212, at 1142-43 & n.8.
232. See Blake &Jones, supra note 5, at 439 (improper to discriminate in favor of small
businesses simply because they are small); Lande, supra note 7, at 103-04 (assisting small
businesses not a primary purpose of the Sherman Act); Pitofsky, supra note 220, at 1058
(antitrust should not protect small businesses against the rigors of competition and should
not give special rights to distributors "to continuing access to a supplier's products or
services regardless of the efficiency of their distribution operation and the will of the
supplier").
233. See 727 F.2d at 704. To be fair to the dissenters, it should be noted that neither
dissent characterized the issue as protecting small enterprises at the cost of efficiency gains
for consumers, because neither dissent thought that the Star's integration would produce
any efficiency benefits for consumers. While some evidence was ambiguous, however, it
was not apparent, as the dissenters claimed, that no efficiency benefits would result. See
supra note 202.
The dissenters' protectionist stance is also demonstrated by Judge Bright's proposal to
shift the burden to defendants to prove that efficiency benefits would result before al-
lowing a monopolist to vertically integrate. 727 F.2d at 706-07 (Bright, J., dissenting). In
an area where evidence is often ambiguous or speculative, a shift in the burden of proof
could produce a major change in the outcome of antitrust cases and consequently in busi-
ness practices. See Bork, supra note 221, at 410 (placing burden on the firm seeking to
vertically integrate "would stifle a wide variety of socially valuable transactions by placing
the burden always upon the defendant to prove the existence of claimed efficiencies").
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balancing of antitrust objectives. By exhibiting a sensitivity to-
wards the competitive process and lower prices, 234 the majority re-
jected the position that courts should be concerned only with
allocative efficiency.235 The majority also avoided a bias towards
smallness that would lead courts to prohibit efficient business prac-
tices. Although Paschall did not call for the reconciliation of all the
goals claimed for the antitrust laws, it did require the court to con-
sider two of the more extreme positions in this matter. By re-
jecting these extremes, the court was able to remain faithful to the
central goals of the antitrust laws.
V. CONCLUSION
In Paschall, the court came close to "stand[ing] the Sherman Act
on its head." 236 Had it done so, distributors would have used laws
designed to enhance competition to protect their own monopolies.
Paschall signals an end to the misplaced principles concerning
vertical integration by newspapers that began with Aibrecht. By
focusing on the role of advertising in the newspaper industry's rev-
enue structure and properly employing the economic theory of op-
timal monopoly pricing, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the
Star's integration could not have been undertaken to extract
higher prices from consumers. The court also properly interpreted
the antitrust laws as being designed to promote competitive
processes rather than to protect small businesses. By demonstrat-
ing the proper sensitivity to economic theory, industry structure,
and the goals of antitrust, the court presented a good example of
how to apply antitrust law to a complex area.
234. See supra notes 211-12.
235. See supra note 212.
236. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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